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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have traditionally protected franchisors in their attempts to
develop additional outlets when and where they see fit.' This protection
was based upon the discretionary powers that franchisors had reserved
for themselves in their franchise agreements.' The extent of the discre-
tion retained by the franchisor has become the focus of "the long-fought
war over market 'cannibalization,' pitting expansion-minded franchisors
against their defensive franchisees."'3
On July 6, 1992, in Scheck v. Burger King,4 a federal district court
in Florida made "devastatingly clear" its determination to protect fran-
chisees in their battle against franchisors over territorial rights.5 This
Note analyzes the Scheck court's rationale for holding that Steven A.
Scheck, the franchisee, could be protected from expansion by Burger
King Corporation ("Burger King"), the franchisor, and, more impor-
1. Franchise Furor Signals Need for Cooperation and Conciliation, NATION'S RESTAURANT
NEWS, September 28, 1992, at 37 [hereinafter Franchise Furor]. See generally David J.
Kaufmann, Franchising: Legislative and Judicial Update, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 1992, at 1
(hereinafter Kaufmann, Update]. Mr. Kaufmann is a partner of Kaufmann, Feiner, Yamin, Gildin
& Robbins, which represents franchisors nationwide. Id.
2. Id.
3. Richard Martin, Franchisee Gains Ground in BK 'Cannibalization' Suit, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, February 10, 1992, at 1.
4. 798 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (denying a motion for reconsideration) (Scheck I1).
5. See Martin, supra note 3, at 78 (quoting Harold Brown, the franchisee's Boston-based
attorney in Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (Scheck 1)).
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tantly, illustrates how this holding breaks from the court's traditional
approach of protecting franchisors.
In their attacks on franchisors' expansionary tactics, franchisees are
alleging unfair encroachment with increasing frequency and are "bring-
ing lawsuits over their franchisors' purported breaches of the 'implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' "6 Although "the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing was applied to franchising and franchisors
with a vengeance in the 1980's,' 7 courts were reluctant to create a zone
of territorial protection for a franchisee where the operative franchise
agreement clearly intended or expressly afforded none.' In those cir-
cumstances, the judiciary "forcibly rejected attempts to utilize the cove-
nant [of good faith and fair dealing] to infer or imply territorial
protection or exclusivity."9 Even so, there has been a " 'growing effort
by franchisees and their lawyers to use the doctrine of implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing' to restrain franchisors."' 0
This Note analyzes the requirement of good faith in franchise con-
tracts as it affects judicial protection of franchisees' territorial rights."
It focuses on the ability of the courts to force franchise contracts into an
open, competitive market, which ensures that both parties are aware of
and bargain for all contract terms. Central to this Note is the distinction
between the denial of territorial exclusivity and the reservation of the
franchisor's unlimited right to establish additional franchises. This Note
concludes that the court has used the covenant of good faith to ensure
that the parties to the franchise contract bargain for the territorial terms
of the contract.
In Scheck,'2 the franchisee sued Burger King for damages caused
by Burger King's establishment of a competing franchise. 3 Burger
6. Franchise Furor, supra note 1.
7. David J. Kaufmann, Franchise-Related Mergers, Acquisitions and LBO'S: Threshold
Issues of Law, in FRANCHISING 1992: BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES, at 327 (PLI Comm. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 603, 1992) [hereinafter Kaufmann, Threshold Issues]. Mr.
Kaufmann is chairman of the Practicing Law Institute on Franchising.
8. Id. at 329.
9. Id.; see Kaufmann, Update, supra note 1, at 1.
10. Martin, supra note 3, at 78 (quoting Philip F. Zeidman, general counsel to the
International Franchise Association).
11. In 1992, franchise outlets accounted for $717 billion in sales, which amounts to 34% of
all domestic retail sales. David J. Kaufmann, An Introduction to Franchising and Franchise Law,
in FRANCHISING 1992: BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES, at 11 (PLI Comm. Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 603, 1992) [hereinafter Kaufmann, Introduction]. The number of franchise
outlets has more than doubled in the last decade to over 533,000, and there are over 2,200
franchisors and 7.7 million franchise employees. Id.
12. Plaintiff, Steven A. Scheck operated a restaurant located in Lee, Massachusetts under a
franchise agreement with Burger King. Scheck 1, 756 F. Supp. 543, 545 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
13. Id. at 545. The Complaint filed on February 6, 1989, alleged that "Burger King's decision
to sanction the Marriott Corporation's conversion of a Howard Johnson restaurant to a Burger
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King moved for summary judgment' on the ground that because the
Franchise Agreement specifically denied the franchisee "any area, mar-
ket or territorial rights,"' 5 Burger King's acts were explicitly authorized
by the Franchise Agreement and could not constitute bad faith. 6 This
Note considers Scheck's allegation of breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (Count II of the Complaint), the only count
which survived the motion for summary judgment. 7
The court disagreed with Burger King's contention and found that
"[tihe express denial of an exclusive territorial interest to Scheck does
not necessarily imply a wholly different right to Burger King-the right
to open other proximate franchises at will regardless of their effect on
[Scheck's] operations."'" Judge Hoeveler emphasized that Burger
King's own policies and procedures were developed to protect against
"cannibalization" and the potential ruin of neighboring franchises, which
would weaken the Burger King chain.' 9 Judge Hoeveler found that
"while Scheck is not entitled to an exclusive territory, he is entitled to
expect that Burger King will not act to destroy the right of the franchisee
King franchise two miles away from Scheck's franchise in Lee, Massachusetts" damaged Scheck.
Id. The case was originally filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. Id. Burger King moved to dismiss and/or transfer the case pursuant to the forum
selection provision of the Assignment Agreement. Id. Judge Frank H. Freedman, Chief United
States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts, denied Burger King's motion to dismiss
and transferred the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, in an order dated June 15, 1989. Id.
14. Burger King moved for summary judgment on all four counts of the complaint, which
alleged breaches of (1) an implied non-competition agreement; (2) an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing; (3) an implied contract created by promissory estoppel; and (4) the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, alleged to incorporate the previous claims. Id.
15. Id. at 549 (citing Franchise Agreement § 1). Burger King also argued that Scheck's
claims were barred by the statute of frauds, or were released by two documents executed by
Scheck in 1985 and 1986. Id. at 545.
16. Id. at 549.
17. Id. The court granted summary judgment as to the other counts of the complaint and
ordered that they be dismissed. Id. at 548-50. For a complete discussion of the court's rulings as
to Count I, which alleged breach of an implied non-competition agreement, see id. at 548; as to
Count III, which alleged breach of an implied contract created by promissory estoppel, see id. at
549-50; and as to Count IV which alleged breach of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act
claimed to incorporate the previous claims, see id. at 550. The court also denied and dismissed
Burger King's affirmative defenses of release and statute of frauds. Id. at 546-48.
18. Id. at 549.
19. Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted the deposition testimony of Burger King Region
Vice President Charles Olcott that a " 'Burger King site would not be approved for a franchisee
where there would be an issue of large sales deterioration at a nearby existing Burger King, which
would stem from the opening of the new store in question' . .. each site approval was made on a
'case by case basis.' " Id. at 549 n.12 (citing Olcott Dep., pp. 19-22).
In fact, Los Angeles attorney and franchise law specialist, Mitchell S. Shapiro, believes the
court denied summary judgment "largely because of evidence that Burger King had internal
policies aimed at preventing cannibalization .... [which] suggest that 'even Burger King didn't
feel it had carte blanche to open units anywhere without regard for its franchisees.' " Martin,
supra note 3, at 78.
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to enjoy the fruits of the contract. 20
Thereafter, Burger King moved for reconsideration, bringing the
issue of good faith before the court again. While finding no "sound
basis (either in law or policy) upon which to retreat from the above
analysis, 21 the court elaborated on the reasoning behind the decision.
Significantly, the court analyzed the Franchise Agreement itself and
concluded that the agreement lacked the explicit contractual language
necessary to authorize Burger King's actions in this case.22 The court
found that, despite the express denial of an exclusive territorial interest
to the franchisee in the Franchise Agreement, the principles of good
faith and fair dealing precluded the franchisor's predatory actions.23 The
court's interpretation of the Franchise Agreement contradicted both Bur-
ger King's arguments24 and other judicial interpretations of similar con-
tracts.25 By implying an obligation of good faith, the court has forced
Burger King into an open, competitive market. That is, the court has
required Burger King to bargain explicitly with franchisees for the right
to establish competing franchises in the future.
II. PERSPECTIVE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises from the
common law contract doctrine of implied promises or conditions.26
Most jurisdictions require the performance of contractual obligations in
good faith, implying a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
20. Scheck 1, 756 F. Supp. at 549 (citation omitted).
21. Scheck 11, 798 F. Supp. 692, 694 (S.D. Fla. 1992). On the motion for reconsideration, the
court considered "the pertinent portions of the record, the relevant case law, and the arguments
presented by counsel" at the hearing on the motion. Id.
22. "[A]ithough the language of the Franchise Agreement states that the franchisee cannot
expect an exclusive territory, such language does not even mention the franchisor, let alone does
the language provide that Burger King retains the unlimited right to establish Burger King
franchises at any location desired." Id.
23. Id. at 696.
24. Burger King relied on the provision in the Franchise Agreement specifying that " '[tihis
license is for the described location only and does not in any way grant or imply any area, market
or territorial rights proprietary to FRANCHISEE.' " Id. at 695 (citing Franchise Agreement, at 2)
(footnote omitted). Burger King maintained that this language should have made the court's
analysis simple and brief, because of the Florida rule precluding the implication of an obligation
of good faith in "derogation of the express terms of a contract." Id.
25. Fickling v. Burger King Corp., [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
9099, at 18,825 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished opinion) (applying Florida law). See discussion
infra notes 76-80, 89, 115, 125-30 and accompanying text.
26. Robert T. Joseph, Do Franchisors Owe a Duty of Competence?, 46 Bus. LAw. 471, 483
(1991).
27. See Joseph W. Sheyka, State Franchise and Dealer Protection Laws, in 28TH ANNUAL
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contract.2 The implied covenant is contained in the Restatement of
Contracts,29 codified in the Uniform Commercial Code3" and, more
importantly, recognized by Florida law.3"
The classic formulation of the implied covenant doctrine was
articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in 1933, in Kirke La
Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co. 32 The court stated that "in every con-
tract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract. '33 Thus, the actions of the
parties to a contract are limited and each party must substantially per-
form thereunder to accomplish the contract's purposes.34
According to the Restatement, every contract "imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement." 35 "Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the other party .... ,36 Even when a
party believes its conduct to be justified, the common law obligation of
good faith may be violated. Bad faith37 may comprise action or inac-
tion, including "subterfuges and evasions," and fair dealing "may
require more than honesty. ' 38 Bad faith is conduct proscribed because it
violates "community standards of decency, fairness or reasonable-
ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DIsTRnutmoN AND MARKETING, at 1015 (PLI Corp. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 625, 1988).
28. See id.; Joseph, supra note 26, at 482. But see Monroe County Oil Co. v. Amoco Oil Co.,
75 B.R. 158, 163 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (Indiana law does not recognize an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
30. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989).
31. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1985); Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d
1171, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). See also First Nationwide Bank v. Florida Software Servs., Inc.,
770 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1991); East Bay Ltd. Partnership v. American Gen. Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 744 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 619 (11th Cir.
1991); Green Cos. v. Kendall Racquetball Invs., Ltd., 560 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990);
Harrison Land Dev. Inc. v. R & H Holding Co., 518 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987);
Brickell Bay Club Condominium Ass'n v. Hernstadt, 512 So. 2d 994, 997 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987),
review denied, 520 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1988); Coira v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 429 So. 2d 23, 23 (Fla.
3d DCA 1983); Bowers v. Medina, 418 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
32. 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
33. Id. at 167.
34. Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 327.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
36. Id. cmt. a.
37. Logically, the opposite of good faith.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (1979) ("subterfuges and evasions
violate the [common law] obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes
his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist
of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty.").
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ness."3 9 Rather than providing a precise definition of bad faith, the
Restatement offers guidance by means of illustration. 40
Similarly, under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), every
contract imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and
enforcement.4" The UCC provides two definitions of good faith.
According to Article 1, which applies throughout the UCC, good faith is
"honesty in fact in the conduct or the transaction concerned."'42 Under
Article 2, which applies only to the sale of goods,43 the elements of good
faith comprise "honesty in fact" and compliance with "reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."'  The Article 2 standard
requires" 'a state of mind' in which '[a] party is advantaged only if [that
party] acted with innocent ignorance or lack of suspicion.' 45
These formulations of good faith are phrased broadly in order to
protect the reasonable expectations of the bargaining parties and to ful-
fill "the basic purpose of contract law."'4" Further, where the express
promises of the contract do not adequately express the full intentions of
the parties, the courts will imply a promise.47 When a court implies a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it is recognizing that the parties
"occasionally have understandings or expectations that were so funda-
mental that they did not need to negotiate about those expectations." 8
39. Id. cmt. a. 1
40. Thus, bad faith includes "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and
slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance." Id. cmt. d.
41. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement."). For a thorough discussion, see generally Steven
J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69
IowA L. REv. 497 (1983); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm.
L. REv. 666 (1963); B. J. Reiter, Good Faith in Contracts, 17 VAL. U. L. REv. 705 (1983); Robert
S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and
the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
42. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989).
43. Id. § 2-201.
44. Id. § 2-103(l)(b).
45. Jason D. Topp, Comment, International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp N. Am.,
Inc.: A Contractual Relationship Between Loan Applicant and Lender, 76 MINN. L. REv. 131,
137 (1991). This standard is sometimes referred to as the "rule of 'the pure heart and the empty
head.' " Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 798, 812 (1958).
46. 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 654A(A) (Supp. 1993); Joseph, supra note 26, at 483 (citing
Corbin).
47. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 561 (West 1960 & Supp. 1993). Corbin observes that "it has
become more fashionable for courts to talk of 'good faith' than of 'implied covenants.'" Id.
48. Id. § 570; Joseph, supra note 26, at 484 (citing Corbin).
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Of course, determining what understandings or expectations were so
fundamental that they were not negotiated begs the question.
Because of the foregoing considerations, the application of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to franchise contract
controversies has been the subject of much debate.49 In some respects,
franchise contracts are "precisely the type of contract whose interpreta-
tion and enforcement can be assisted by. appropriate use of the implied
covenant. ' 50  Good faith and fair dealing typically limit the manner in
which one party can exercise contractually-granted discretion, thereby
protecting the reasonable expectations of the other party to the con-
tract.5 ' Thus, the implied covenant is an important limit on the amount
of discretion traditionally afforded the franchisor. 52  Further, "[t]he
terms of franchise agreements are often vague or ambiguous[, as] the
contracting parties did not (and indeed could not) anticipate every con-
tingency that might occur during the course of the often extended
franchise relationship. '53 The implied covenant helps solve this prob-
lem by putting interpretative boundary lines in a contract where ambigu-
ity lies. Accordingly, the "courts have consistently held that there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in any franchise
agreement. ' 54
Problems sometimes arise, however, because courts disagree about
what constitutes good faith5 and about the effects of implying good
49. Joseph, supra note 26, at 481. For a general treatment, see Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369 (1980).
Although there is a split among courts about whether the UCC itself or only its principles are
applicable to a franchise relationship, courts have uniformly applied the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing to these agreements. Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 328.
Courts have often imposed a duty of good faith in non-UCC contexts. Gerard Mantese, The
U.C.C. and Keeping the (Good) Faith, 70 MicH. B.J. 270 (March 1991). Additionally, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been imposed by statute into the franchise relationship,
in one fashion or another, in Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, South Dakota, Washington,
and Wisconsin. Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 328.
50. Joseph, supra note 26, at 481.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 Bus.
LAW. 289, 308 (1989). See, e.g., Davis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
9384 (6th Cir. 1989); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 938 (1979); Tulsa Trailer & Body, Inc. v. Trailmobile, Inc., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 8615 (N.D. Okla. 1986).
55. Topp, supra note 45, at 135-36. The scope and meaning of the iniplied covenant has been
addressed in cases concerning the establishment of new franchises adjacent to a plaintiff's
existing location, and in cases involving the relocation of franchise sites and termination of
franchise relationships. Joseph, supra note 26, at 481. For a general discussion of the implied
covenant in the context of franchise terminations, see T. Mark McLaughlin and Caryn Jacobs,
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:671
faith.56 The good faith obligation has become increasingly important in
the franchising context as franchisees frequently attempt to "require
action by their franchisors not specifically required by the terms of their
franchise agreements or established by their courses of dealing."57 In
some cases, franchisees seek to revise or supplement the terms of their
franchise agreements in order to prevent conduct which otherwise may
be "expressly authorized by their franchise agreements."58 In these situ-
ations, franchisees argue that they are only attempting to "preclude
franchisors from dishonestly or unfairly usurping or denying them the
benefits of their contracts."59 Although courts may imply the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing where the nature of the bargain is not
changed, arguments to extend the implied covenant beyond its tradi-
tional limits60 are typically rejected, and generally have been
unsuccessful. 6'
Even though the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sometimes
assists the court in interpreting the intention of the parties where the
contract is silent or ambiguous, it will not be used to override express
contractual provisions.62 Courts are usually reluctant to rewrite con-
tracts, especially commercial ones.63 In addition, courts "demonstrably
loathe to utilize the [implied] covenant ... to disturb the express terms
Termination of Franchises: Application of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
7 FRANCHISE L.J. 1 (Summer 1987).
56. As Judge Hoeveler notes, "the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves an
intricate and amorphous legal construct." Scheck I1, 798 F. Supp. 692, 697 n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
57. Sheyka, supra note 27, at 1069.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Joseph, supra note 26, at 483.
61. Id.
62. Pitegoff, supra note 54, at 308; see, e.g., Domed Stadium Hotel v. Holiday Inns, 732 F.2d
480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The implied obligation to execute a contract in good faith usually
modifies the express terms of the contract and should not be used to override or contradict them.")
(citation omitted) (applying Louisiana law); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 819-20
(D. Minn. 1989) (action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
dismissed because plaintiff's claim that mass distribution of prepackaged pints of ice cream
violated the agreement was contrary to the express language of the agreement which reserved the
right for the franchisor and trademark owner to distribute products by any method); Patel v.
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding the
covenant of good faith did not bar the defendants from establishing a new franchise within one
mile of plaintiffs' business because the franchise agreement expressly granted the defendants the
unqualified right to establish a new business); Rado-Mat Holdings, U.S., Inc., v. Holiday Inns
Franchising, Inc., No. 76747, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1991) ("Under the facts in this
case, [the] implied covenant of good faith cannot contradict or alter an explicit term set forth in a
contract."); Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988) ("[I]t would be a contradiction in terms to characterize an act contemplated by the
plain language of the parties' contract as a 'bad faith' breach of that contract.").
63. Joseph, supra note 26, at 483.
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of a franchise agreement,"" because such a revision would "defeat
rather than fulfill the parties' expectations. '65 Consequently, "the judici-
ary has forcibly rejected attempts to utilize the covenant to infer or
imply territorial protection or exclusivity where the contract is clear that
none was intended or expressly afforded."66 Practice indicates that
whether a franchisor's conduct breaches the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing undeniably depends on the facts of a given case67
and, quite logically, on the terms of the particular contract.68
Federal courts had already interpreted the pertinent language of the
Burger King form contract. In Fickling v. Burger King Corp.,69 the
Fourth Circuit "interpreted the exact same language contained in the
Franchise Agreement entered into between Scheck and Burger King and
found that such contractual language barred a cause of action under
Florida law for breach of the implied covenant of good faith. '70  The
Fourth Circuit based its decision on the understanding that "the obliga-
tion of good faith will not be implied in derogation of the express terms
of a contract."' Fickling's claim was disposed of because implying an
obligation of good faith and fair dealing would have overridden the
Fourth Circuit's reading of the express terms of the Franchise
64. Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 329; see, e.g. Fickling v. Burger King
Corp., [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 9099, at 18,825 (4th Cir.
1988) (unpublished opinion) (Under Florida law, the "obligation of good faith will not be implied
in derogation of the express terms of a contract."); Puretest Ice Cream, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 806 F.2d
323, 325 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that accepting a mere lack of good reason as a violation of the
implied covenant of good faith would transform the indefinite term contract from one terminable
at will into one terminable for cause); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d
672, 679 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that where a contract expressly provided for termination on 30
days notice, a good faith requirement would not be implied to override explicit contractual
provisions); Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that
language in standardized purchase order allowing termination at any time meant without cause);
Jack Rowe Assocs. v. Fisher Corp., 639 F. Supp. 564, 567-68 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that
where a contract expressly provided for termination on 30 days notice, a good faith requirement
would not be implied to override explicit contractual provisions), vacated on other grounds, 833
F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1987).
65. Joseph, supra note 26, at 483.
66. Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 329. But see Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat
Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). Kaufmann observes,
however, that "most franchise agreements by their terms confer territorial exclusivity upon
franchisees." Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 329.
67. Sheyka, supra note 27, at 1069. For a more comprehensive review of the ways in which
franchisors' acts have been found to breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see id.
68. See cases cited supra note 62.
69. Fickling v. Burger King Corp., [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
9099, at 18,825 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished opinion).
70. Scheck I1, at 798 F. Supp. 692, 699 (S.D. Fla. 1992). See Fickling, [1987-1989 Transfer
Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) at 18,824-25.
71. Fickling, [1987-1987 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) at 18,825.
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Agreement.72
Burger King asserted that Judge Hoeveler would have to either
grant its motion for summary judgment, or depart from a long line of
precedent regarding implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.73
Burger King also contended that the Court would have to ignore the
express terms of the contract between Scheck and Burger King in order
to rule in favor of Scheck.74
In denying Burger King's motion for summary judgment, however,
Judge Hoeveler did not disagree with the Fourth Circuit's understanding
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Rather, Judge Hoeveler
refused to read the Franchise Agreement's denial of territorial exclusiv-
ity to the franchisee as a reservation of unlimited power to the franchisor
that could be used to establish additional franchises.
III. ANALYSIS
This part of the Note is divided into two distinct sections. The first
section analyzes Judge Hoeveler's application of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and argues that the Scheck decision correctly
makes use of that implied covenant. The second section analyzes the
court's decision under the auspices of game theory and concludes that
Judge Hoeveler's decision is also correct under that doctrine.
A. Implying a Covenant of Good Faith Does Not Depart From
Precedent
Arguably, Judge Hoeveler "appears to be rewriting the law gov-
erning territorial encroachment vis-a-vis the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. 75 For franchisors, the opinion is a "disturbing
exception" to the rule against implying the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because it gives a franchisee an exclusive territory where the
franchise agreement does not grant such a right.76 Perhaps the impact of
the Scheck opinion is a matter of perspective.
In fact, Scheck's significance does not lie in a radical departure
from long standing precedent. Rather, it lies in the clarity with which
Judge Hoeveler grasped the economic effects of Burger King's argu-
ments and contracting strategies. The court clearly states that "the pre-
72. Id.
73. See Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. at 698-99.
74. Id.
75. Kaufmann, Update, supra note 1, at 7.
76. Id. at 7 ("Can the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing be applied to create a
zone of territorial protection for a franchisee when the operative franchise agreement confers
none? Until recently, the answer would be an emphatic 'no.' ").
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cedent-setting value of the Court's decision today is not nearly as
immense as [Burger King] suggests; this Court is simply not issuing a
decision contravening the rule expressed in the case law holding that the
implied covenant cannot override an explicit contractual term.""
The line of authority typically cited for the proposition that the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing will not be implied in contradiction
of express contractual provisions78 must be read carefully. In those
cases, the contracts contained language denying exclusive territory,
license, or distribution area to a franchisee or licensee,7 9 as well as
explicit language granting the franchisor or licensor the right to establish
competing franchises, issue competing licenses, or pursue competing
business opportunities."0 Thus, the rule restated by Judge Hoeveler is
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be implied into a
contract that not only disclaims an exclusive territory for the franchisee,
but also gives the franchisor the right to establish competing franchises
at will.8 ' According to Judge Hoeveler, this rule did not control in
Scheck, because Burger King did not unequivocally reserve for itself the
right to establish competing franchises at will. 82
Implying the covenant of good faith and fair dealing into a
franchise contract is also encouraged by the relational theory of con-
tracts.8 3 In fact, relational contract theory is particularly suited to long
77. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. at 698.
78. See cases cited supra note 62.
79. Id.
80. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. at 698. See Hotel v. Holiday Inns, 732 F.2d 480, 483 n. 1 (5th Cir.
1984) ("[T]he Licensor has, and shall continue to have during the life of this license agreement...
the right to construct and operate one or more Holiday Inns at any place other than on the site
licensed hereby."); Carlock v. Pillsburg Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 819 (D. Minn. 1989) ("[T]he
franchisor and its parent companies explicitly reserved the right to distribute Haagen-Dazs ice
cream by any method."); Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1159 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1986) (The agreement provided that " 'DUNKIN' DONUTS, in its sole discretion, has the
right to operate or franchise other DUNKIN' DONUTS SHOPS under, and to grant other licenses
in, and to, any or all of the PROPRIETARY MARKS, in each case on such terms and conditions
as DUNKIN' DONUTS deems acceptable.' "); Rado-Mat Holdings, U.S., Inc. v. Holiday Inns
Franchising, Inc., No. 76747, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1991) ("The Commitment
Agreement and License Agreement contains precise language, reserving to itself the right to
license any business activity at any location .. "); Super Valu Store, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores,
Inc., 431 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) ("Super Valu retained the 'right to choose and
select its ... retailers and to enter into Super Valu Retailer Agreements with other parties at Super
Valu's sole choice and discretion.' ").
81. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. at 699. Alternatively, Judge Hoeveler states that "these cases can
be read as holding that irrespective of whether an exclusive territory is explicitly denied to the
franchisee, a court simply cannot imply the covenant of good faith where the contract grants to the
franchisor the right to establish additional franchises at any location desired." Id. at 699 n.12.
82. Id. at 699.
83. Cf. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Implied Covenant: Anachronism or Augur?, 20 SE'roN HALL L.
Rv. 683, 718 (1990) (discussing employment contracts as opposed to franchise agreements). Ian
Macneil largely developed the relational theory of contracts. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE
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term ongoing contractual relationships such as a franchise agreement.84
While traditional contract theory focuses on the "discrete transaction,"
examining the parties' relationship only at the moment of contract for-
mation,85 relational contract theory contemplates a contractual regime
where the parties intend to maintain an ongoing relationship. 6 In rela-
tional contract theory, "parties treat their contracts more like marriages
than like one-night stands. 87
In such a contract, it is impossible to "allocate optimally all the
risks at the time of contracting" because of the intricacies or uncertain-
ties of "future contingencies."8 8 For relational contracts, the traditional
contractual analysis is not a "feasible contracting mechanism" because it
is impossible to perfectly allocate future risks into well-defined contrac-
tual promises." Accordingly, relational contract theory focuses more on
preserving the contractual relationship than on interpreting the specific
language of the contract.
Under relational contract theory, "[o]bligations are not frozen in an
initial bargain. They evolve over time as circumstances change ...
The object of contracting is to establish and define a cooperative rela-
tionship, not merely to allocate risk."'9 Consequently, "parties are obli-
gated to behave in a way that promoted the relationship, and in a way
that is consistent with the needs and expectations of both parties."'
Thus, classic interpretive methods which focus on the discrete con-
tractual agreement to determine the parties' intent constitute "fundamen-
tal error."92  Relational contract theory recognizes that "wealth
NEw SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY ItO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 886 (1978); Ian R. Macneil, Values in
Contract-Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340 (1983); see also William C. Whitford,
Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 545 (1985).
84. Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism,
Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REV. 791, 795 (1991); see also Perritt, supra note 83, at 718
("Relational contract theory is a way to reduce the artificiality of applying formal contract law
doctrines to continuing legal relationships that are best thought about in contractual terms.").
85. John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 1307, 1383 n.263 (1986).
86. Keith A. Palzer, Relational Contract Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 727, 728 (1988).
87. Robert W. Gordon, Macauley, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in
Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 569 (1985).
88. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv.
1089, 1090 (1981).
89. See id. at 1090.
90. Perritt, supra note 83, at 713.
91. Id. at 717. Perritt observes that this "central concept of the relational theory" virtually
restates the idea of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
92. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1303
(1990).
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maximization is not the only important aspect of the bargain,"93 particu-
larly in a long-term contractual relationship.94 In fact, if one party fails
to perform in accordance with the contract, the other party's role is to
cooperate and accommodate instead of rigidly requiring technical
performance.95
Relational contract theory thus "legitimates the implied covenant"
of good faith and fair dealing.96 Moreover, relational contract theory
helps clarify "the ways in which the covenant should be understood and
applied in actual cases." 97 In emphasizing the preservation of the rela-
tionship, relational contract theory expands the traditional contract
"norm of contractual solidarity."98
Likewise, relational contract theory makes broad use of extrinsic
evidence in interpreting contract terms, expanding on the traditional
notions of course-of-dealing and trade usage.99 Relational contract the-
ory requires courts to consider broadly the contractual relationship."°°
Although perhaps acting intuitively, 01 in accordance with the recent
development of relational contract theory, courts have increasingly
found rights and duties arising out of the parties' dealings with each
other throughout the course of their relationship. 102
Judge Hoeveler also recognized the importance of how Burger
King has dealt with its franchisees. While examining Burger King's
own policies, which were aimed at protecting franchisees from unlimited
expansion, Judge Hoeveler observed that even Burger King dealt with
the franchisees as if the Franchise Agreement did not reserve for Burger
King the unlimited right to establish additional franchises. Burger
King's policies prove that the Fickling court was too quick to grant a
dismissal. That is, Burger King's policies recognize, at a minimum, that
93. Id. at 1302.
94. Tidwell & Linzer, supra note 84, at 796. Tidwell and Linzer observe that "a party to a
long-term contractual relationship does not always simply seek to maximize her own wealth
opportunities, but often also considers the needs and expectations of the other party, with whom
she has dealt before and will deal again." Id.
95. Perritt, supra note 83, at 713.
96. Id. at 718.
97. Id.
98. Macneil, Values in Contract-Internal and External, supra note 83, at 362; Perritt, supra
note 83, at 714.
99. Perritt, supra note 83, at 716-17.
100. See Feinman, supra note 92, at 1303. Of course, a flexible regime of contract
interpretation may only lead parties to be more specific in their contracts, and may make long-
term contracts more cumbersome in their provisions. Likewise, "imposing a norm of flexibility
may cause parties to be more precise in specifying the terms of their contracts and therefore less
flexible." Id. at 1303-04.
101. Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN.
SURv. AM. L. 139, 166.
102. Tidwell & Linzer, supra note 84, at 795 (citing cases as examples).
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the parties would deal with the issue of encroachment of additional
franchises at some point in the future. Burger King neither promised
territorial rights, nor gave itself the right to do whatever it pleased. Con-
sequently, granting a motion for summary judgment would render Bur-
ger King's own policies essentially meaningless."t 3 Thus, if given
effect, Burger King's policies support Judge Hoeveler's interpretation of
the Franchise agreement."°
Judge Hoeveler's only departure from precedent is "from the
Fickling court's reading of the language of the Franchise Agree-
ment.'" 5 Under Judge Hoeveler's reading, the "absence of language in
this contract of adhesion which would preserve unto [Burger King] the
clear right" to grant competing franchises mandates factual inquiry and
consideration of the implied covenant. 10 6 Thus, the central issue is not
whether a covenant of good faith should be implied, but rather whether
it applies to the specific provisions regarding territory under
consideration. 1 7
If Burger King wished to reserve the right to take predatory action,
it should have done so clearly and explicitly in the Franchise Agree-
ment.'018 Indeed, Judge Hoeveler suggested that Burger King's problem
could easily be solved by clearly and unambiguously inserting into its
franchise agreements the right to establish competing franchises.1 °9
Burger King's ability to rewrite the contract to reserve this right, how-
ever, is constrained by the economic consequences because such a con-
tractual revision would reduce the value of a franchise."1
The key question under Judge Hoeveler's analysis is why a cove-
103. Instead, the Scheck decision effectuates Burger King's own policies, at least to the extent
that they may be considered by a jury.
104. Moreover, even if the contract is read as the Fickling court suggests, relational contract
theory may suggest that Burger King's own policies ought to be given effect even over express
terms to the contrary. See Perritt, supra note 83, at 716-17. Although, "[ilt is ironic to say that
conduct 'interprets' terms when it practically rebuts express terms or dramatically changes them."
Id. at 717.
105. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. 692, 699 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
If a franchise agreement gives the franchisor the right to build (or permit building)
another store next door to the one earlier permitted, it had better say so in clear
terms. If it does not-if the franchisor has not given unto itself the right to be
predatory-then it should be prepared to defend its position on a good faith-that
is, reasonable conduct-basis.
Id. at 699-700.
109. Id. at 700.
110. Because "there are very few companies that can do that without affecting the
marketability of their concepts." Martin. supra note 3, at 78 (quoting general counsel to the
International Franchise Association, Philip F. Zeidman).
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nant of good faith and fair dealing should be implied, not whether the
covenant should be implied."' In Scheck, implying a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would bring the franchise arrangement into an
open competitive market. On the other hand, interpreting the contract as
denying the franchisee an exclusive territory and granting Burger King
the right to establish competing franchises at any location would permit
the franchisor to receive more than fair market value for the sale of a
franchise. Beyond implied covenant doctrine, an analysis of the Burger
King Franchise Agreement under the concepts of game theory provides
insight into how and why Judge Hoeveler's decision is correct.
B. Modem Game Theory as a Basis for Understanding the Court's
Opinion
Game theory" 2 is a theory to predict the rational behavior by two
or more interacting rational individuals, each determined to maximize
his own interests as determined by individual utility or payoff. 1 3 These
interests may include selfish and unselfish components.' The underly-
ing assumptions of classic game theory" 5 include the following: (1)
each individual seeks to maximize individual utility; (2) the various pos-
sible outcomes of a particular situation are well-specified; (3) individu-
als have consistent preferences among outcomes; and (4) all individuals
111. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in
a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice
of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short,
because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative
measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465-66 (1897).
112. Although the title is perhaps misleading, "game theory" is "the study of the basic
elements of many person conscious conflict and cooperation. It deals, at a high level of
abstraction, with the description and analysis of multiperson cross-purposes optimization." Martin
Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CN. L. REv. 285, 285 (1991).
The key elements in the development of the theory of games are (1) the formal
description of the games; and (2) the proscription or description of how the game is
or should be played. The former involves the formalization of the rules of the
game.... The latter provides normative or behavioral solution theories dealing with
how the game should be or is played.
Id. For an interesting review of Shubik's paper, see Ian Ayres, Three Approaches to Modeling
Corporate Games: Some Observations, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 419 (1991).
113. Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in RATIONAL CHOICE 82, 89 (J.
Elster ed. 1986) (emphasis omitted).
114. Id. That is, motives are not necessarily economic or short term, and sanctions are not
always legal. See David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 373 (1990).
115. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFUCr 162-72 (1963)
(describing classic game theory); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS:
INTRODUCTION AND CRITCAL SURVEY (1957) (same).
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know the preference patterns of others. 116 Game theorists, however,
concede that reality is not necessarily reflected in these assumptions." 7
In fact, classic game theory's usefulness has been criticized for
"deal[ing] with games so well defined that there is no room for bargain-
ing." ' 8 More importantly, the classic models generally do not consider
misinformation." 9 Accordingly, "[m]uch of the color of bargaining, and
with it much of what makes a real difference to whether it goes one way
or another, escapes such models."' 20 Therefore, modem game theory
focuses on noncooperative games involving individuals with asymmetric
and imperfect information, and relaxes the assumptions of classic game
theory.121
Modem game theory is a particularly useful tool for analyzing the
formation of Burger King's "contract of adhesion" 22 Franchise Agree-
ment because of asymmetric and imperfect information available to the
parties. 23  In this agreement, information is particularly important
because the agreement requires an initial allocation of the risks of long-
term future contingencies. 24 The disparity of information available to
Burger King and its franchisees, including the degree to which the con-
tract grants protection from predatory acts by Burger King, illustrates
the correctness of the court's decision.
As previously noted, Burger King's Franchise Agreement explicitly
denies an exclusive territorial interest to the franchisee. 25 The contract
is silent, however, regarding Burger King's right to establish franchises
in close proximity to existing Burger King restaurants. 26 This silence is
a windfall for Burger King if the contract offers no protection to a
franchisee.
Without a specific clause in the Franchise Agreement granting Bur-
116. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. Rv.
615, 643-44 n.85 (1992) (citing LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 115, at 4-5).
117. See, e.g., SCHELLINO, supra note 115, at 4; LucE & RAIFFA, supra note 115, at 5.
118. David Braybrooke, The Possibilities of Compromise, 93 ETHics 139, 144 (1982).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Scott, supra note 116, at 643-44 n.85. For a thorough analysis of modem game
theory, see ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
(1989).
122. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. 692, 699 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
123. For a comprehensive treatment of an imperfect information model of standardized form
contracts, see Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and
the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 272-93 (1990).
124. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. Rav.
2005 (1987) (providing a thorough analysis of the decisionmaking strategies of parties to long-
term commercial contracts using the techniques of modem decision analysis and game theory).
125. Scheck 1, 756 F. Supp. 543, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing Franchise Agreement § 1).
126. Scheck 11, 798 F. Supp. at 696.
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ger King the right to establish Burger King restaurants at any location it
selects, a franchisee may have expectations that some degree of protec-
tion from predatory acts by Burger King exists.' 27 Courts should protect
these expectations where they are reasonable. When a court does not
find such expectations reasonable, the franchisee receives no protection
and Burger King reaps the benefits of predatory action without giving
consideration. In such circumstances, Burger King can charge a higher
price for a franchise than it would have if the franchisee understood that
its sizable investment could be attacked by the placement of a competi-
tive Burger King anywhere and at any time.128 A decision that did not
imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, such as the Fickling
decision,'29 would effectively grant Burger King the ability to receive
the benefits of a specific clause, without bargaining for it and without a
reduction in price to reflect the franchise's diminished value. In the
instant case, if Judge Hoeveler had determined that the contract granted
no protection to Scheck despite his expectations, then Scheck paid an
unfairly high price for the franchise.
Judge Hoeveler's decision is economically correct because it
unequivocally implies a covenant of good faith, establishes some protec-
tion from predatory acts, and forces franchisors to compensate franchis-
ees for market intrusions. Thus, even if Burger King chooses not to
rewrite the contract in any fashion, the Scheck decision forces Burger
King to buy out its existing franchisees before it can establish franchises
located in the same vicinity. Thus, the franchise will approach actual
open competitive market value.
One side effect to the Scheck decision is that the franchisee will
have increased bargaining power. Although, Burger King has the infor-
mational advantage in the macro-economy, the micro-economic advan-
tage often belongs to the franchisee, particularly once the franchisee has
been operating for some time. If there is imperfect information, Burger
King will have an experience and expertise advantage over a new fran-
127. Even Burger King's own policies indicate that Burger King expected that a franchisee
would have some protection from Burger King establishing additional franchises without
limitation. Franchisees are justified in their expectations that Burger King had not reserved to
itself the right to unconditionally grant additional franchises since Burger King's own policies
expressly protect franchisees from the effects of such a reservation of power. Scheck 11, 798 F.
Supp. at 549, 549 n.12. Further, Scheck's complaint contained a pleading of fraud, alleging that
Burger King continuously stated that it has a policy of protecting franchisees by not establishing
additional franchises near existing franchises.
128. Scheck purchased the restaurant property for $690,000 and made $200,000 in
renovations, according to his Miami attorney, Robert Zarco. John H. Kennedy, Suit Argues Lee
can't Support 2 Burger Kings, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 1992, Economy Section, at 37.
129. [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 9099, at 18,825 (4th Cir.
1988) (unpublished opinion).
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chisee. If, however, Burger King is forced to purchase territorial rights
from an established franchise, the franchisee will have the advantage in
the bargaining process because the franchisee knows the profit margin of
the franchise and has a greater understanding of its market value. More-
over, the franchisee knows that Burger King will pay nearly as much for
these territorial rights as it would receive for the new franchise it wants
to establish. 3' This is because Burger King can make its profit in a
narrow margin, as long as it can sell a new franchise for slightly more
than it needs to pay for the territorial rights.
On the other hand, if the contract includes an explicit clause grant-
ing exclusive territory to the franchisee or reserving the franchisor's
right to establish additional franchises for Burger King, the parties have
bargained for protection from predatory acts. In that scenario, the price
of a Burger King franchise reflects an open competitive market, and
includes the price of territorial exclusivity. 3 ' If Scheck forces Burger
King to rewrite its form franchise agreement, then Burger King, the
drafter of the contract of adhesion, will have the burden of creating a
provision which explicitly grants itself territorial rights. 132
Even though the Franchise Agreement is an adhesion contract in
form, 133 it may be less of an. adhesion contract in economic reality.
Franchisees may be "little guys" relative to franchisors, but they do have
the power to walk away from Burger King's offer. At the point of entry
into a contract, at least, the franchisee has alternative investment
options.
In future contracts, Burger King must decide whether to rewrite its
franchise agreements to include a term of territorial exclusivity, reserve
the unlimited right to establish additional franchises, or wait until it
wants to develop additional franchises to purchase those rights from
existing franchises. It is the position of this Note that it is in Burger
King's interest to bargain for the buyout at the time of contract forma-
tion because Burger King is then favored by imperfect information. By
forcing Burger King to choose between these options, the court has
brought Burger King's Franchise Agreement into an open economic
market.
130. Burger King will receive the new franchise fee less transaction costs, yielding the smallest
profit.
13 1. Of course, a franchisee may wish to pay for exclusivity, while a franchisor may wish to
pay for "predatory" rights or for the reservation of the rights to establish additional franchises.
132. This Note does not address situations where there is a seller's market. If there are very
few franchisors supplying franchises, Scheck's impact is significantly decreased because the
franchisees have substantially less bargaining power.
133. Scheck I1, 798 F. Supp. 692, 699 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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IV. CONCLUSION-
Scheck v. Burger King Corp. is correct both from a legal perspec-
tive and from an economic standpoint. The traditional rights of
franchisors to open additional franchises at will' 34 have been protected
by the courts.'35 Although most franchise agreements confer territorial
exclusivity upon franchisees by their terms,' 3 6 some franchisors seek to
have their rights to expand restricted by nothing but their own
discretion. 137
The court in Scheck held that when franchisors do not specifically
reserve the right to establish additional franchises at will, franchisors'
discretion to expand must be exercised in good faith. There is no ques-
tion that the Franchise Agreement expressly denies Scheck an exclusive
territorial interest.131 Yet, the court also found that the Franchise Agree-
ment did not specifically reserve for Burger King the right to open
franchises at will regardless of the effect on its other franchises.' 39 The
court, thus, quite correctly departed from the Fickling court's loose read-
ing of both the contractual language and of precedent regarding the
implied covenant of good faith.140
The Fickling court agreed with the franchisor's assertions. That
court's interpretation of precedent rejected the use of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing "to infer or imply territorial protection or
exclusivity."' 4'' Further, the Fickling court protected franchisor interests
and sought to avoid creating "a zone of territorial protection for a fran-
chisee when the operative franchise agreement confers none."' 42 Thus,
the Fickling court found itself compelled by the Florida rule that "the
obligation of good faith will not be implied in derogation of the express
terms of a contract."1 43 The Fickling court's decision is troubling
because it narrowly reads franchise case law'" and ignores economic
perspectives. "45
The Burger King Franchise Agreement fails to preserve the clear
134. Franchise Furor, supra note 1, at 37.
135. Kaufmann, Update, supra note 1, at 7.
136. Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 329.
137. Kaufman, Update, supra note 1, at 7.
138. Scheck I1, 798 F. Supp. 692, 694 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
139. Id. at 694, 699.
140. Id. at 699-700.
141. Kaufmann, Threshold Issues, supra note 7, at 329; see Kaufmann, Update, supra note 1,
at 7.
142. Kaufmann, Update, supra note 1, at 1.
143. Scheck 11, 798 F. Supp. at 699.
144. Id. at 698-700.
145. See discussion of game theory supra part ILI.B.
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right to establish Burger King restaurants at any location it selects. 46 In
the absence of such clear language, to allow Burger King the unfettered
right to open franchises defeats the open competitive market. Under the
Fickling court's analysis, Burger King pays nothing for, and collects
payment despite, the "unfettered" right.
After Scheck, Burger King will be forced to bargain for territorial
rights. The Scheck opinion is more economically sound than the prior
approach used by Florida courts, because it prevents Burger King from
utilizing the term of the contract that denies a franchisee an exclusive
territorial interest to destroy the fruits of the contract. Scheck validates
the" 'growing effort by franchisees and their lawyers to use the doctrine
of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing' to restrain franchisors.' 4' 
Unquestionably, the Scheck v. Burger King Corp. decision will restrict
Burger King's ability to expand at its own discretion, and will affect the
battle for territorial rights between franchisors and their franchisees.
ADAM B. LEICHTLING
146. Scheck II, 798 F. Supp. at 699-700.
147. Martin, supra note 3, at 78 (quoting Philip F. Zeidman, general counsel to the
International Franchise Association).
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